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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A. CHRYSLER,
Plaintiff &
Appellant,
Case
No. 8515

-vs.GRACE CHRYSLER,
Defendant &
Res·pondent.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPElLAN\T
The parties will be referred to as they appeared below, the appellant herein being the plaintiff, and the
respondent, the defenda n't.
The figures in parentheses refer to the page number
of the Record; when preceded by the abbreviation Tr.,
reference is to the transcript of the testimony.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff filed his Complaint for Divorce against the
defendant in the District Court of Grand County, State of
U:tah, on the 21st d·ay of April, 1955 (1 ). Defendant, on
the 27th day of April, 1955 filed her Answer and Counterclaim thereto (5-7}. Defendant filed a reply to said
Coun·terclaim on the 12th day of May, 1955 (1 0).
Plaintiff's attorney at the outset of this case and
at the time of ~the entry of the Decree herein was Maxwell
Bentley, Esquire, of Moab, Utah. Shortly after the Decree
was entered, Mr. Bentley withdrew as plaintiff's counsel.
Plaintiff then employed Edward Sheya, of Price, Utah, to
represent him in proceedings to set aside the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce in the
Trial court. From an adverse ruling therein, said attorney
was employed to prosecuie this appeal.
During the pendency of this action, the plaintiff became a resident of the State of Nevada. A trial setting
herein was made for November 28, 1955 at 10 A. M.
wi·th the concurrence of plaintiff's former attorney, Maxwell Bentley, and Hanson and Ruggeri, attorneys for defendant. Said setting was made in plaintiff's absence
while he was in Nevada. Plaintiff was engaged in the
cons,fruction business, and was performing such work in
Nevada at said time (Tr. 20}. Mr. Bentley sent a letter to
plaintiff prior to November 28, 1955, wherein he advised
plaintiff that said case was to be heard November 28,
1955 at 10 o'clock A.M. at Moab, Utah (PI's Exh. 2 p. 1)
The said letter was addressed to the plaintiff in care of
Joseph P. Holler, his Nevada attorney, at Suite 1, Mason-
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'•..

ic Building, Reno, Nevada. The said Joseph P. Holler
was at said time plaintiff's attorney in connection with
ano'ther action filed in Nevada. (PI's Exh. 2). Said let'ter
was not opened by attorney Haller for the reason thal it
was addressed to said plaintiff in care of said attorney
and said attorney was not authorized 'to open said mail.
(PI's Exh. 2). He caused said letter to be filed in his office
until such time as plaintiff came to his office. By coincidence, on November 28, 1955, at about 10:30 A. M.
Reno, Nevada time, p·laintiff happened to come to attorney Holler's office and said attorney then handed him
said letrter. The plaintiff opened it in the presence of said
attorney and for the first time was apprized of said trial
date (PI's Exh. 2 pp. 1-2). There is one hour's difference between Reno, Nevada time and Moab, Utah time;
tha·t 10:30 A. M. Reno, Nevada time would be 11 :30 A.
M. Moab, Utah time; plaintiff first learned of said trial
date approximately one and one-half hours affer the
hearing was scheduled 'to and did commente (PI's Exh. 2)
The trial Court heard the defendant's evidence on her
counterclaim on November 28, 1955, commencing at 10
A. M., awarded iudgment against the plaintiff, and recessed at 10:30 A. M. on said date, all in ·the absence of
both p·laintiff and his a·ttorney (21 ). When plaintiff opened said lefter on November 28, 1955 at 10:30 A.M. Reno
time (11 :30 A. M. Moab time) it was too late to procure
counsel to appear for him at said trial. He didn't know
until later on said day that his attorney of record, Mr.
Bentley, was in Wyoming when the hearing took place.
Plaintiff caused a telephone call to be placed to the office of his said at'torney upon opening said letter, by at-
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torney Haller, which call was answered by one Kline D.
Strong, who shared a telephone line with attorney Bentley at Moa·b (PI's Exh. 3). Mr. Strong was asked by
Mr. Haller to find out what disposition had been made of
the Chrysler case and to call him back. Strong contacted
Veone Dalton, Clerk of the District Court of Grand County
and later advised the plaintiff by telephone that judgment in the case had already been entered against Mr.
Chrysler {PI's Exh. 3). From Mr. Kline's written
statement, {PI's Exh. 3), it appears there was some
understanding between Mr. Bentley and the plaintiff that
Mr. Bentley was to try to get a postponement of this case,
until some future time, but it does not appear therefrom
until what date. Since plaintiff did not know of the setting of November 28, 1955, and a postponement was
mentioned to Mr. Strong after knowledge of this trial
date, the postponement must have been contemplated
for some date beyond the date finally agreed upon by the
respective attorneys.
By reason of the above and foregoing, plaintiff did
not have an opportunity to attend said hearing, nor did
he have an opportunity to present any evidence before
the trial Court, nor to contact counsel in time to attend
said hearing or to request the trial Court to allow plaintiff sufficient time to attend said hearing and to give testimony at the same. Plaintiff was prevented from attending said hearing through no fault of his own, and was
free from any negligence in connection therewith {38).
The Court below on January 4, 1956, about 5 weeks
after the hearing, entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree in favor of the defendant (22-
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33), awarding her a lump sum judgment of $5,000.00
payable forthwith, together with monthly sums of
$100.00 per month, commencing December 1, 1955, to
continue as long as defendant remained unmarried, all
for and as alimony (30). Said lump sum was made the
first lien upon cerltain real property consisting of a number of uranium claims, more particularly described in said
Decree (30, 31, 32). Defendant was furt'her awarded the
fol'lowing property, to-wit: One deep freezer, one 1953
Mercury Sedan, one 1954 Fleetwood 21 foot house trailer, together with certain personal effects, wearing apparel and ornaments, together with the sum of $200.00
as an attorney's fee for defendant's attorneys (33). Said
lump sum of $5,000.00 was awarded to defendant notwithstanding the fact that she did not specifically pray
for the same in her counterclaim (6, 7), and the evidence
fails to sustain the same. The findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree herein were filed in the office of the Clerk of Grand County, Utah, on January 4,
1956 (22, 29).
1

Plaintiff made a Motion to set aside said Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of law and Decree filed February
9, 1956 (37). A hearing was had thereon before the
Honorable F. W. Keller, District Judge, on February 27,
1956 (45). Said Court, on said date, made an order denying said Motion, without preiudice. The formal order was
signed March 7, 1956 and filed March 9, 1956 (47).
Notice of the las·t Order was served on March 8, 1956
and filed March 9, 1956 (48). It is from said Order that
plaintiff prosecutes this Appeal.
5
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It is conceded that the plaintiff had taken up residence in the State of Nevada pending the trial setting
and hearing in this action. He had retained counsel in ·the
State of Utah to prepare the case for trial and to notify
him of the date the maitter would be heard. The case had
been pending from the 21st day of April, 1955 to the
28th day of November, 1955, the day it was heard in
plaintiff's absence. In the interim, plaintiff's business interests 'took him to the State of Nevada. As aforesaid, he
was engaged in the construction business and said business took him to various states·. He had lived in the States
of California (Tr. 35), Utah (Tr. 4), Nevada (Tr. 34), and
now resides in Colorado (Tr. 36), where he is following
the same vocation. Although he intended to return to the
State of Utah to prosecute this action, as soon as he was
no·tified of the date of trial, while he was in Nevada and
after having established residence there, he filed an action for Divorce in that State against the defendant (Def's
Exh. 4). Plaintiff did no t thereby intend to, nor did
he abandon the Utah action. This position is substantiated by the fact that he continued to retain the services of
1

1

his attorney, Maxwell Bentley, to represent him in the
Utah action. Plaintiff was expecting to receive notice
from said attorney as to the date of trial. Mr. Bentley
did send written notice thereof, wh·ich did not come to
plaintiff's attention in time for reasons stated above (PI's
Exh. 2). Plaintiff caused a telephone call to be p'laced
immediately to Mr. Bentley upon opening the le,tter from
the latter notifying him of the trial date (PI's Exh. 3).
Plaint'iff through attorney Holler requested Mr. Strong
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to ascertain the status of this case and to notify him
(PI's Exh. 3). Mr. Strong did so, as aforesaid. Such
solicitude on the pat4t of the plaintiff does not evince
any intention whatsoever on his part to abandon this
case. His reasons for filing an action in Nevada do not
appear in the Record, because plaintiff has never had the
opportunity to appear before the trial Court and present
his side of the case. The trial Court was urged to set
aside the Findings and Decree herein, 'in order to permit
the plaintiff to enlighten 1the Court on all pertinent matters in connection with this case. His motion was denied.
Plaintiff has never had his day in Court with res·pect to
this action. Through no fault or negligence of his own,
the plaintiff has been deprived of an opportunity of presenting his evidence in support of his Comp·laint to the
trial Court. All he has reques:ted and now requests is that
he be accorded such an opportunity, which would be in
accordance with ius·tice, equity and fair play.
The Record in this case is uncontroverted on the
proposition that plain~iff learned too late of the setting
date of this action. It is true that his attor~_L_ Bentl_~r_~----~·{
knew of said date, and tha·t he attemped to communicate
the same to the plaintiff. Mr. Holler, in his Affidavit, in
evidence herein, explains the circumstances surrounding
the receipt of Mr. Bentley's letter by him and states it
was unopened until plaintiff came to his office November
28, 1955, at about 10:30 A. M. Reno time (PI's Exh. 2),
and the same remains uncontradicted. Said Affidavit unequivocal'ly points out why it was physically impossible
for plaintiff to be present at said hearing in Moab, and
that plaintiff tried in vain to contact his a·ttorney, Mr.
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Bentley, as soon as he opened said letter and learned for
the first time of the date of said hearing.
There is no evidence in the Record impeaching the
facts set forth in said Affidavit, and upon the basis thereof, plaintiff was deprived of the opportunity to be heard
in said case by circumstances wholly beyond his control,
and wi~thout any fault on his part. Under such facts and
circumstances plaintiff avers it was an abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial Court to deny plaintiff's Motion
to set as'ide said Findings and Conclusions and Decree.
The ques~tion before this Court is, Should the plaintiff be denied his day in Court, because he did not learn
of the trial date in time to be present and to give testimony thereat, in view of all the above circumstances?
There is no evidence that he had actual knowledge of the
trial setting until after judgment had been entered. He
used due diligence upon first learning belatedly thereof.
His affidavit states that he would have attended said
hearing had he seasonably received notice thereof; that
he had a meritorious cause of action which he was prevenlted from presenting through no fault of his own (3741 incl.).

SPECIFICATIO'N OF POINTS RELIED UPON
1. The Court was without jurisdiction to enter judgment in this case.
2. The Court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Divorce Decree.

BRIEF OF THE ARGUMENT

8
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1. THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING A DECREE
OF DIVORCE HEREIN FOR LACK 0'F JURISDICTIONAL
FACTS.
2. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DIVORCE DECREE UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OiF THIS CASE, THUS ABUSING ITS
DISCRETION.
ARGUMENT

I
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING A DECREE 0'F
DIVORCE HEREI'N FO,R LACK 0'F JURISDICTIONAL
FACTS.
Sec. 30-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, provides, among other things, " . . . and the
Court may decree a dissolution of the marriage contract
between the plaintiff and defendant in al'l cases where
the plaintiff shall have been an actual and bona fide resident of this state and of the county where the action is
brought for three months next prior to the commencement
of the action ... " (Emphasis mine).
I submit that the on'ly evidence touching directly
on the subiect of residence is found on page 4 of the
Transcript of the Reporter, commencing on line 15, to-wit:
"Q. Now during the, this complaint was filed on the

11th day of April, A. D. 1955. How long have you
been a resident of Grand County, you and your husband, prior to that time?
A. We first came out two years ago in November.
Q. In November of 1953?

9
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A. Yes.
Q. And you have been a resident of Grand County,
State of Utah, three months before the commencement
of this action against you, is that right?
A. Yes." (Transcript p. 4, lines 15-24). (Note: The complaint was actually filed April 21, 1955. The ten day
summons was served April 11, 1955) (3, 4).
The above is the sum and substance of defendant's
testimony as to residence in the State of Utah, and the
County of Grand, for the purpose of securing a divorce
from plaintiff on her counterclaim. It does not meet the
requirements of our statute, to-wit: Sec. 30-3-1, U.C.A.
1953, as amended. There is no evidence that defendant
was an actual and bona fide resident of this state for
one year, and of the County of Grand for three months
next prior to the commencement of the action. Defendant's tes·timony :that she and her husband first came to
Utah two years ago in November (November, 1953) does
not fullfill the statutory requirements cited. Defendant's
testimony does no~t show that either she or her husband
were actual and bona fide residents of this state for one
year nex·t prior to the commencement of this action, nor
does it show tha~t either or both of them were actual and
bona fide residents of Grand County for three months
next prior to the commencement of the action. Defendant's evidence simply is that she and her husband first
came out to Utah two years ago in November {which
would be November, 1953). There is no testimony that
they came out for the purpose of estab·lishing residence
in Urta·h or that they, or either of them, have been actual
and bona fide residents of this State since November of
1953, or one year next prior to the date of the commence10
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ment of said action. Since this matter goes to the ques~tion of iurisdiction, it is vital that the evidence clearly
show the requisite period of actual and bona fide residence next prior to the commencement of the action.
It does not do so. Jurisdiction can not be pres·umed,
waived, nor conferred. Not only does the evidence fail to
show bona fide and actual residence for the requisite
period, but there is no showing that the claimed residence
of either party was next prior to the date of the commencement of !the action.
Furthermore, as to residence in the County of Grand,
defendant was asked merely if she had been a resident of
Grand County three months before the commencement of
the action against her (Emphasis mine). (Tr. p. 4, lines
21-23). She was not asked whether she was an actual
and bona fide resident, or whether she had been such
three months next prior to the commencement of the
action. This is very important, because, as the question
was put, defendant could well have been a resident of
Grand County for three months at any time before the
commencement of the action, but not necessarily next
prior theretto, and still she could have answered the question put to her in the affirmative. Suppose she had resided
in Grand County from November, 1953 to December 31,
1954, but had abandoned s·aid residence on the latter
date. Since the question put to her was whether she had
resided in Grand County three months before (no·t next
prior) to April 11, 1955, the da'te 1the action was started,
she could ~truthfully answer "yes" to said question, but
this would not entitle her to a divorce because said residence, according to our statute, must be three months
next prior to ,fhe date the action is started. Yet, the only
11
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testimony in the record relative to defendant's residence
in Grand Couny is that she resided there three months
before the commencement of the action against her. This
showing clearly does not conform to the requirements
of said Sec. 30-3-1, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, and the
Court was without jurisdiction to award defendant a
divorce upon this evidence. There was no attempt made
to clarify or explain the residence of the defendant to
show that it v1as actual and bona fide for the requisite
period, or to show that it was next prior to the date the
action was commenced. This omission on the all-important and decisive question of jurisdiction is fatal to defendant's action, and we urge this Court rto dismiss said action
for lack of jurisdiction. Under the circumstances, it was incumbent upon defendant to prove that either she or
plaintiff complied with our statutory residence requirements in order to procure a divorce on her counterclaim.
Weiss V. Weiss Ill U. 353, 179 P. 2nd 1005.
It has also been held that the matter of residence in a
divorce action is jurisdictional and cannot be waived by
the parties. Branch V. Branch, 30 Colo. 499, 71 P. 632.
The evidence must support a finding as to residence
for the requisite period. Even though there is an allegation of such residence in the Complaint and an admission
of such residence in the answer, the same is not sufficient,
si nee the fact of residence is a jurisdictional prerequisite,
and the evidence must affirmatively show the required
residence. See People V. District Court, (Colo.), 258 P.
2nd, 483.
In the case at bar, Defendant in her counterclaim
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alleged:
"1. Defendant is a resident of Grand Coun·ty, State
of Utah, and has been for more than three months prior
to the filing of plaintiff's complaint herein" (6). It will be
noted that defendant did no1 allege such residence as
being actual and bona fide, nor that it was next prior to
the commencement of said action (6). Plaintiff admiUed
said allegation in his reply (1 0).
Therefore, neither the defendant's counterclaim,
nor the evidence above cited, conform to the requiremen~ts of Section 30-3-1 U.C.A., 1953, as amended, to
confer the necessary iurisdiction to enable the court to
grant a divorce. See People V. District Court, supra.
In Hampshire V. Hampshire, 70 Idaho 522, 223 P.
2nd 950, 21 ALR 2nd 1159, under Sec. 32-701, IC, which
provides: "A divorce must not be granted unless the p·laintiff has been a resident of the state for six full weeks
next preceding the commencement of the action," the
Idaho court said, "To constitute a residence within the
meaning of the divorce statute, !there must be a habitation or abode in a particular place, for the required time,
and an intention to remain there permanently or indefinitely. An actual residence as dis~tinguished from a constructive one is required. 17 Am. Jur. 280; 27C.J.S. Divorce, Sec. 76, p. 644; Wood V. Wood 140 Ark. 361,215
681."

s.w.

The Idaho statute cited in ~the Hamps·hire case above
did not require "actual" residence, but the court held
actual residence as distinguished from a constructive one
is required. Our Utah sta1tute contains the words "actual"
13
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and "bona fide" residence.
In the present case, neither "actual" nor .. bona
fide'' residence is shown. There was no effort to show
residence of the required kind, and certainly it was not
shown that there was the residence required by the statute for the three month period nex.t prior to the commencement of the action.
In Weiss V. Weiss, supra, the trial court found,
among other things, that the plaintiff had not been an
actual, bona fide resident of the county and state for the
required statutory time. A decree of "no cause of action"
was entered agains:t the plaintiff and he was ordered to
pay the defendant $729.00 for the expenses of the suit,
temporary alimony and attorney's fees. The first question
this court was caNed upon to decide was whether or not
the trial court erred in deciding the merits of the case
after it had found that the plaintiff did not have the residence required by the statute to empower the court to
grant a divorce.
In the course of its opinion, this court said: "The
subiect matter of a divorce action is the status of marriage existing between the plaintiff and defendant. The
distridt courts of this state have iurisdiction of divorce
generally, but do not have iurisdiction of the status of
marriage existing between every husband and wife . . .
.. The pronouncement by the Legis·lature that 'the
courtt may decree a dissolution of the marriage contract
. . . where the plaintiff shall have been an actual and
bona fide resident of this state and of the county where
the action is brought for three months next prior to the
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commencement of the action' es tablishes some of the prerequisites to the district court obtaining iurisdiction
of the status of marriage exis'ting between the plaintiff and defendant in a particular divorce action. The
above quoted sentence stating that 'the court may decree
a dissolution of the marriage contract', e'tc. by implication also states that the court may not (shall not) decree
a dissolution of the marriage conltract where the plaintiff shall not have been an actual and bona fide resident
of this state and of the county where the action is brought
for three monrths next prior to the commencement of the
1

action. This is a limitation on the power of the court to act
in respect to the marriage contract and the marriage status ensuing therefrom. If the court finds that there was an
actual and bona fide residence as specified, it has the
power to dissolve or refuse to dissolve the contract, depending on what it concludes as to the merits of the case.
If it finds that there was not such residence, it has no
power to further act as to the marriage contract and if
it acts in such regard it exceeds i,ts authority."
In the case at bar, the court could not find from the
evidence that either the plaintiff or the defendan;t had
been an actual and bona fide resident of the county and
s'tate for three months next prior ~to the commencement of
the action because the evidence does not show any such
residence. It is, therefore, plaintiff's contention tha1t the
court had no power to act because i't had acquired no
iurisdiction and when it did act the court acted wholly
without authority.

II
15
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THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DIVORCE DECREE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, THUS ABUSING ITS DISCRETION.
Rule 60 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
provides, in part: "Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable
Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such terms as are iust, 'the court may in
the furtherance of iustice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final iudgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; ... "
Plaintiff's affidavit herein sets forth that he has a
meritorio-li~Cause of action herefnQ (39). The same has not
been disputed. The Findings and Decree herein were filed
January 4, 1956. Plaintiff made his motion to set aside
the same on February 9, 1956.
"Where timely relief is sought from a default iudgment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt,
if any, should be resolved in favor of the motion to set
aside the iudgment so that cases may be decided on
their merits." Moore's Fed. Practice, Vol. 7, p. 224.
The iudgment taken herein was in the absence of
the plaintiff and is in the nature of a default.
In Bylund V. Crook, 60 U. 285, 208 P. 504, although
this court held tha't no reasonable grounds existed to set
aside lthe default iudgment, the court further stated: "Our
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trial courts are usually very liberal in vacating and setting
aside default judgments entered against a defaulting
partly by reason of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable
neglect, or in case where there has been fraud or decei~t
practiced. Under our prac:tice it is generally regarded as

an abuse of discre·tion for a trial court not to vacate and
set oside a default iudgment where there is any reasonable ground for doing so, and timely application is
made." {Emphasis mine).
In Cutler V. Haycock, 32 U. 354, 90 P. 897, summons was served upon the defendant and he sent the
same to his attorney about 50 miles away. The at;torney
prepared a demurrer and caused it to be served on plaintiff's attorney by leaving a copy at his residence with his
v1ife, the attorney being absent, on the last day allowed
for service, and on the same day mailed the demurrer
with proof of service attached to the Clerk of the Court,
but it did not reach 'the clerk until after the default had
been entered against the defendant. Before judgment,
defendant requested plaintiff's attorney to call the
cou~t's attention to the demurrer. Plaintiff's attorney refused, offered proof and took judgment.
While our court states that the default and judgment were entered herein as of strict legal right, the main
ques tion in the court's opinion was, Should the default
and judgment have been set aside by the District Court
upon the showing made by appellant? The court points
out the general rule that whether a defaulrt and judgment should or should no't be vacated is one to be passed
upon by the trial court, and that it res ts wit'hin its sound
discretion is elementary. The court then says, "It is equal1

1
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ly elementary that this discretion is to be applied to the
facts as they appear in each case, and, in the exercise of
this discretion, the aim and obiect should be the promotion and furtherance of iustice and the protection of the
rights of all concerned. As has been well said, in all
doubtful cases the general rule of courts is 'to incline towards granting relief from default, and to bring about
a iudgment on the merits. (Ci.ting authorities). This rule,
as it appears from the authorities, is of almost universal
application, and is defeated only in cases where the default is the result of inexcusable neglect of the party in
default, or where it would be inequitable to set it aside."
The court after sta·ting that appellant's conduct was
not without some excuse due to the sparsely se'ttled
country where none of the modern facilities or conveniences for communication are shown to exis:t, and the attorney and client lived abou't 50 miles apart, etc., says
further: "Upon the other hand, there is not the slightest
intimation that the responden't would have suffered
either inconvenience or 'loss of any kind by setting aside
the default. If costs are involved, the court can always
protect against those. This is not a case where a party
at grea1t expense and sacrifice of time had prepared for
trial, and would be compel'led to undergo it all again if
the other party is permitted to defend; nor does it present
a case where any evidence has been lost to the prevailing party."
Again, the court says: .. Law and courts alike abhor
a result that condemns a party unheard, and, unless the
law unavoidably requires and iustice demands it, where
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a party has not by his own inexcusable neglect deprived
himself of the right, 'the courts should, and will, where
equity permits, afford relief, to the end tha't a party may
be given a hearing." The court directed the distr'ict court
to vacate the judgment and se't aside the default.
The court distinguishes this case from Peterson V.
Crosier, 29 U. 235, 81 P. 860, where the defendant
answered and was absent from the trial. Appellant's affidavit, the court found, :tended to show a deliberate intent
on the part of appellant to abandon his defense and permi't plaintiff to take judgment against him. He and his
counsel were advised that the case would be called for
trial on the day for which it was set, but instead of pre··
paring and appearing for trial, he showed indifference
which is wholly inexcusable.
Plaintiff contends the case at bar is similar to the
facts and circumstances set forth in Cutler V. Haycock,
supra, except tha~t plaintiff herein had filed his comp·laint
and reply to defendant's counterclaim, but for reasons
beyond his control, did not learn of the trial se,~ting in
time to be present at the hearing. He wanted to be present and introduce evidence in his behalf. He had retained
counsel :to prepare for trial and 'to advise him of the trial
date. He did not show indifference nor did he a'bandon
the case, but was waiting to hear from his attorney as to
the trial date, and without his fault or negligence, he received the letter of notification of the trial date too late
to be present for the hearing. This was excusable neglect
end surprise entitling him to set aside the Findings and
Decree and to be heard. Furthermore, defendant in the
case at bar will not suffer any loss by having a hearing

19
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on the meri1t's. The court can impose terms, if necessary.
Plaintiff's counsel stipulated at the hearing of the Motion
that the cou~t could do so if it saw fit (Tr. 30).
In Quealy V. Willardson, 35 U. 414, 100 P. 930,
plaintiff brought a friendly mortgage foreclosure suit to
aid defendant mortgagors in settling a third person's
claim, which was accomplished. The suit lay dormant for
about six years by reason of a dispute over plaintiff's attorney fee and a question of interest. At the end of that
time, s·ince no answer was filed, plaintiff took a default
iudgment for the unpaid part of the debt and attorney's
fees. Defendants moved to set aside the default, tendering an answer denying the default and alleging payment.
Held, the motion was improperly overruled, especially since it appears that plaintiff suffered no iniury
through the delay and can suffer none by a trial on the
merits.
Plaintiff calls attention to the case of Utah Commercial & Savings Bank V. Trumbo (Utah) 53 P. 1033. This
action was to recover on a promissory note. Defendant's
attorneys had previously withdrawn from the case and no
answer had been filed during the statutory period, and
iudgment was entered. A motion was made to set aside
the default and permit the defendant to file an answer
and cross-complaint. This motion was denied. From the
affidavits filed in support of said mot·ion, it appeared that
during aU of the proceedings, including the entry of default and iudgment, the defendant was continuously absent from the State of Utah and attending ~to business interests in California. The defendan·t, in his affidavit, stat-
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ed that he had been informed and verily believed that his
attorneys had entered his appearance in the action and
believe·d that they had filed the proper pleadings to protect his rights; that he had no notice of their withdrawal
from the case or of the en.fry of judgment by default until
after the judgment had been taken against him; that
when he learned of the judgment, he wired his a'ttorney
asking if he had n '1t been attending to the case and requesting that he attend to it at once; that the judgment
was a surprise to the defendant and that his application
to vaca'te it was based upon his mistake and excusable
neglect; that after the defendant had verily and fully
sta·ted the facts ~to his attorney, he was advised he had
a good and meritorious defense.
This court, speaking through Justice Bartch, said: "If
in such a case as is presented in this record, a court of
justice can grant no relief, then H would seem difficult
to conceive of a case where a court would be justified in
granting relief from a judgment by default. Surely, it cannot be said that a person liable to be sued leaves his
state at his peril, even when he has employed able counsel to care for his interests, lest perchance a judgment be
taken by default which will leave him without remedy,
regardless of any defense he may have. Such is not the
law, and courts do not favor judgments by defaul1t. The
policy of the law is that every man shall have his day
in court before judgment shall be entered against him,
and where a judgment by default has been entered, and
within the proper time a good defense to the action in
which the judgment was rendered is made to appear,
and it is shown that the default was entered through ex-
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cusable neglect or mistake, the default will be vacated, and iudgment set aside, to permit a trial on the merits.
It is true that ordinarily the setting aside of a iudgment by
default rests within the sound legal discretion of the
court, and ·the appellate court wi'll not interfere, but
where, as in this case, it is made clearly to appear :that
there was such an abuse of discretion, through in·advertence or otherwise, as to render the action erroneous and
unlawful, the appellate court will control such discretio.n,
and set aside the i·llegal action. Such discretion does not
confer upon the court an arbitrary power beyond that of
review. It is an impartial legal discretion, which cannot be
employed to the iniury of any subiect, but must be exercised fairly, reasonably, and in accordance with the esta·blished principles of law. The power of the court to set
aside iudgments by default is recognized and conferred
in Sec. 3005, Rev. St. 1898, and should be liberally exercised for :the purpose of directing proceedings and trying
causes upon their substantial merits; and where the circumstances which led to the default are such as to cause
the court 'to hesitate, it is better to resolve the doubt in
favor of the application, so that a trial may be secured
on the merits.''
The court further stated, "In the case at bar the facts
and circumstances show that it was an unavoidable misfortune to the defendant that he did not know that no
attorney was representing him in the proceedings which
led to the entry of iudgment against him until a~ter the
entry had been made. We are therefore of the opinion
that the court erred in refusing to vacate the default and
set aside the iudgment, and in refusing to permit the de-
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fend ant to plead to the merits."
The case at bar presents even more forceful reasons for setting aside the Findings and Decree because it
is a divorce action. The Courts have generally held that
in such an action, a liberal rule for vacating default
judgments prevails, because the State is interested in t'he
preservation of the marriage relation. See Rehfuss V.
Rehfuss, (Calif.) 145 P. 1020, wherein the Court said a
default judgment of divorce will be set aside on slight
showing, for the state is a Iso interested, being concerned
wi:th the preservation of the marriage relation. See also
McBiain V. McBiain, (Calif.) 20 P. 61; Wadsworth V.
Wadsworth 22 P. 648 (Calif.).
The p'laintiff in the present case had misfortunes
simi'lar to defendant in Utah Commercial & Savings Bank
V. Trumbo, supra. The plaintiff herein had the misfortune of being in Nevada when the case was heard and
he had likewise employed an attorney, in whom he had
confidence, to represent him herein. He also had the misfortune of not receiving the letter sent to him by his attorney, notifying him of the date set for trial until after
judgment was entered, and consequently was not present at the trial (nor was his attorney) and judgment was
rendered agains1 him on the defendant's counterclaim.
As soon as he learned of the trial setting, he immediately
caused an inquiry to be made as to the status of the case
and learned that judgment had already been entered
against him. Therefore, the reasoning of 'the Court in the
Trumbo case applies with equal, if not greater, force to
the case at bar. See Thomas V. Morris 8 U. 284, 31 P~,
446; Capalija V. Kulish, (Ore.) 201 P. 545; Davidson V.
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Pickens, (Okl·a.) 261 P. 2nd. 872; Lake V. Lake, (Wyo.)
1 82 P. 2nd, 824.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the writer submits that the trial court
did not have iurisdiction to grant defendant a divorce on
her counterclaim for the reason that the evidence does
not show the requisite statutory residence on the part of
either the plaintiff or the defendant. However, if this
were a case where the Court did have iurisdiction to act,
the plaintiff's showing that without fault or negligence
on his part, he did not receive notice of the trial setting
until iudgment had been entered against him; that he
used due diligence to find out the status of the case immediately upon receiving said notice; thart he had retained counsel to represent him in the action; that counsel did not appear at the trial and w·as in the State of
Wyoming on the date thereof, which fact plaintiff learned only after the entry of iudgment, together with the
fact ·that the plaintiffs· Affidavit shows that he has a
meritorious cause of action and did move the Court to
set aside the Findings and Decree and within the period
provided in rule 60 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, all
ius,tify the granting of plaintiff's Motion to set aside the
Findings and Decree of the trial court herein. Plaintiff
submits that the refusal of the Court to s·et aside said
Findings and Decree, under all of the facts and circumstances above set forth, was an abuse of its discretion
and is against ·the policy of the law which favors the
principle that every man shall have an opportunity to be
heard before iudgment is entered against him.
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The Findings and Decree of the trial courrt should
be set aside.
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